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David P. Fidler

Cyber War Crimes
Islamic State Atrocity Videos and the Laws of War
The Islamic State has combined its extreme violence
with digital and cyber technologies to produce and distribute globally videos recording atrocities it commits.
This article argues that those in the Islamic State who
make and distribute these atrocity videos are committing war crimes under international law. After introducing the unprecedented phenomenon the atrocity videos
represent (I.), the article first examines the relationship
between international law and propaganda in war and
peace (II.) The article then argues the atrocity videos
violate prohibitions in international humanitarian law
and constitute war crimes (III.). The article concludes
by presenting criticisms of this argument and responses
to the critiques (IV.).

I. Introduction
The armed conflicts in Syria and Iraq have involved
atrocities committed by the self-proclaimed Islamic
State.1 Atrocities occur in most armed conflicts, but
those associated with the Islamic State exhibit distributing features even against the grim realities of war. The
Islamic State has been accused of a sickening range of
atrocities, including genocide, torture, sexual slavery,
rape, use of poison gas, attacks on civilians and civilian
objects, mistreatment and murder of detained civilians
and combatants, forced religious conversions, conscription of children, and the destruction of historical monuments.2 The Islamic State justifies its actions through an
extreme reading of Islamic law, thus rejecting the legitimacy of international human rights law and the international law on armed conflict.3
The scale and severity of these atrocities has produced
calls for its leaders, military commanders, and soldiers
to be investigated, prosecuted, and convicted for systematic violations of international humanitarian law
through commission of the crime of genocide, crimes
against humanity, and war crimes.4 Such demands for
¸
1
2

3

4

Prof. David P. Fidler, Indiana University Maurer School of Law. Further
information about the author at p. 192.
The Islamic State is also variously known as the Islamic State in Iraq and
Syria (ISIS) and the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL).
See Report of the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human
Rights on the Human Rights Situation in Iraq in Light of the Abuses
Committed by the So-Called Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant and
Associated Groups, UN Doc. A/HRC/28/18, 13 March 2015; and
Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the
Syrian Arab Republic-Rule of Terror: Living under ISIS in Syria, UN
Doc. A/HRC/27/CRP.3, 19 November 2014.
For analysis of the Islamic State, see Stern & Berger, ISIS: The State of
Terror (2015) and McCants, ISIS Apocalypse: The History, Strategy, and
Doomsday Vision of the Islamic State (2015).
See, for example, Bellinger, New York Times, 2 April 2015, http://
www.nytimes.com/2015/04/03/opinion/make-isis-leaders-face-justice.
html?_r=0.

criminal accountability are routinely made during and
after armed conflicts, especially since the end of the Cold
War and establishment of the International Criminal
Court (ICC). As with calls for accountability in other
armed conflicts, those seeking accountability for members of the Islamic State face problems, including, for the
moment, the lack of ICC jurisdiction over the armed
conflicts in Syria and Iraq.5
While atrocities in armed conflict and efforts to hold the
perpetrators criminally responsible are depressingly
familiar features of modern war, the Islamic State has
broken new, disturbing ground. As if its behavior and
justifications are not bad enough, the Islamic State has
planned, staged, made, and edited digital recordings of
atrocities and disseminated the videos around the world
over the Internet. These atrocity videos record the execution of enemy fighters and civilians detained by, or under
the authority of, the Islamic State during armed conflict
in Syria and Iraq. The videos record the executions of
single individuals and groups of people by various techniques, including shooting, beheading, isolation, and
crucifixion.6
In these atrocity videos, the Islamic State has brought
together medieval brutality and twenty-first century digital and cyber technologies to produce a phenomenon
never seen before in warfare. Never before has a belligerent in armed conflict deliberately staged, recorded, and
distributed film or videos capturing its commission of
atrocities with the frequency, global scale, and notoriety
achieved by the Islamic State. This article focuses on this
development and argues that the making and distribution of these atrocity videos violate the law of armed
conflict and constitute war crimes.

II. Propaganda and International Law in War
and Peace
Videos produced and disseminated online by the Islamic
State form part of its prodigious propaganda efforts
spanning all forms of media, which seek to persuade
Muslims around the world to support the Caliphate the
Islamic State has proclaimed and is trying to create.7 The
videos depicting the killing of persons detained in military operations by, or under the control of, the Islamic
5 See Statement of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court on
the Alleged Crimes Committed by ISIS, 8 April 2015 (concluding the
ICC does not have jurisdiction to conduct a preliminary examination of
the alleged crimes committed by the Islamic State).
6 This article addresses only videos made by the Islamic State and not genuine or fake videos produced and distributed by other groups or individuals.
7 See Winter, The Virtual “Caliphate”: Understanding the Islamic State’s
Propaganda Strategy (Quilliam Foundation, July 2015).
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State constitute only part of a larger attempt to convince
Muslims of the Caliphate’s dedication to the example
and teachings of the Prophet Muhammed and its claim
to re-constitute the political and spiritual foundation for
the global Islamic community, the umma.8

1. Islamic State Propaganda
The Islamic State’s propaganda activities online, especially through social media, have caused controversy in
Western countries.9 The propaganda plays a role in the
radicalization of individuals, many of whom have traveled, or sought to travel, to Iraq and Syria to join the
Islamic State’s efforts to build and defend the Caliphate.
The importance of this propaganda in the radicalization
process forces liberal democracies to combat it through
counter-messaging efforts (e.g., disseminating information to refute the Islamic State’s claims) or counter-content strategies (e.g., taking down online content associated with the Islamic State), or a combination of these
approaches. So far, the Islamic State’s online propaganda efforts have confounded democracies’ attempts to
address the threat it poses.

2. Propaganda in Peacetime
The Islamic State’s propaganda includes positive messages and images that purport to depict the virtues of the
Caliphate in order to encourage Muslims to support and
join it. Although this type of propaganda forms part of
the radicalization problem, international law does not
prohibit or criminalize it. In peacetime, international
law relevant to propaganda involves treaty prohibitions
on propaganda that advocates aggressive war,10 on
incitement to genocide,11 on incitement to terrorism,12
and on hate speech.13 The prohibitions against propaganda for war and incitement to genocide have influenced the development of individual criminal liability in
international law for these acts, as seen in judgments of
international criminal tribunals14 and provisions of the
Rome Statue establishing the ICC.15 Neither incitement
to terrorism nor hate speech has become an international crime in the way propaganda for war and incitement to genocide have.
However, the Islamic State videos that have caused the
most controversy are not videos that constitute propaganda for war or incitement to genocide. Most of these
videos circulated after armed conflict started, particularly after the Islamic State’s military gains in Iraq in the
summer of 2014. Similarly, the Islamic State was fighting in Syria before the videos in question began frequently appearing online. Nor have these videos been
characterized as incitement of genocide because, among
other reasons, the videos depict atrocities against different groups or people. The Islamic State has been accused
8 Zelin, 9(4) (2015) Perspectives on Terrorism, p. 85 (85 et seq.).
9 Fidler, Countering Islamic State Exploitation of the Internet (CFR Cyber
Brief, June 2015).
10 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 20.
11 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, art. III.
12 Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism, art. 5.
13 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, art. 4.
14 Timmerman, 88 (2006) Int. Rev. of the Red Cross, pp. 838-843 (823 et
seq.).
15 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 25.

of committing genocide against the Yazidi people,16 but
it does not appear as if the Islamic State produced and
circulated videos calling for genocidal acts against Yazidis before such acts began. Videos depicting killing Yazidis might be evidence of the commission of the crime of
genocide rather than the crime of inciting genocide.

3. Propaganda in Armed Conflict
International law applicable in armed conflict also has
rules that apply to propaganda. For example, the crime
of incitement to genocide can be committed during
armed conflict.17 International humanitarian law (IHL)
prohibits propaganda that is perfidious-information
that falsely communicates to enemy forces they are entitled to protection under IHL and results in death, injury,
or capture of such forces.18 Otherwise, IHL permits propaganda, even propaganda that conveys false information to enemy soldiers and civilians in order to undermine their morale and willingness to fight. IHL treats
such propaganda as a legal “ruse of war.”19
The Islamic State videos that depict atrocities are propaganda, but they are not perfidious under IHL. If these
videos involve neither incitement to genocide nor perfidious acts, then it would appear they do not violate what
are thought to be IHL’s traditional regulations of propaganda during armed conflicts. The argument that the
Islamic State’s atrocity videos constitute war crimes
must, therefore, has to find its basis in IHL rules not typically associated with acts of propaganda undertaken
during armed conflict.

III. Prohibitions and Crimes in International
Humanitarian Law
1. The Atrocity Videos and Prohibitions in International Humanitarian Law
For both international and non-international armed
conflicts, IHL-in both treaty law and customary international law-prohibits belligerents from engaging in:
– Acts that humiliate, degrade, or otherwise violate a
person’s dignity;20
– Acts or threats of violence the primary purpose of
which is to spread terror among civilians;21 and
– Measures or acts of terrorism directed at persons protected by IHL, including detained persons and civilians.22
The Islamic State violates these prohibitions in producing and distributing online the atrocity videos.

16 Cumming-Bruce, New York Times, 19 March 2015, http://www.nytime
s.com/2015/03/20/world/middleeast/isis-genocide-yazidis-iraq-un-pan
el.html.
17 Rome Statute, art. 25.
18 International Committee of the Red Cross, Customary International
Humanitarian Law Database [hereinafter ICRC, Customary IHL Database], Rule 65 (perfidy).
19 Ibid., Rule 57 (ruses of war).
20 Ibid., Rule 87 (humane treatment).
21 Ibid., Rule 2 (violence aimed at spreading fear among the civilian population).
22 Geneva Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of the Civilians in
Time of War, art. 33; and Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and relating to the Protection of Victims of
Non-International Armed Conflicts (Additional Protocol II), art. 4.
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a) Humiliation, Degradation, and Other
Violation of Dignity
The prohibition on acts that humiliate, degrade, or otherwise violate a person’s dignity is anchored in the principle that civilians and persons hors de combat must be
treated humanely during armed conflict. This principle
reflects the importance of respecting each person’s
human dignity in times of war. In previous and current
armed conflicts, countries and IHL experts have argued
that forcing prisoners of war to parade in public23 or on
television to make coerced statements24 violated the
humane treatment principle. The scope of this principle
includes protecting a person’s dignity after death, as evidenced by specific IHL rules on despoiling or mutilating
the dead.25
Making videos that record the execution of individuals
captured or under the control of the Islamic State and
distributing those videos online for global viewing violates the dignity of the murdered individuals. Traditionally, protecting a person’s dignity after death during
armed conflict has focused on ensuring appropriate
treatment of the physical remains.26 However, the underlying principles of humane treatment and human dignity
are not restricted in application only to the remains of
the dead. The Islamic State’s use of digital recordings disseminated online constitutes a new way of despoiling an
individual and violating his or her dignity, potentially
thousands of times as people view the killings in places
far from the theatre of battle.

b) Acts or Threats of Violence Intended to
Spread Terror Among Civilians
IHL also prohibits in international and non-international armed conflicts acts or threats of violence the primary purpose of which is to spread terror among civilians.27 This prohibition arises from the general principle
of civilian immunity from attacks during armed conflict.28 Acts of violence, or threats of violence, that violate this prohibition come in many forms, and include,
for example, indiscriminate attacks on civilian populations, torture, and rape.29
The making and online distribution of the atrocity videos demonstrate that the Islamic State uses them to send
violence-laden messages to civilian populations about
what happens to those who oppose it. The videos serve:
as a reminder of the group’s self-proclaimed supremacy and its ability to exact revenge on behalf of Sunni
Muslims against the Crusader-Shi’ite-Zionist conspiracy allegedly mounted against them. [The]
Islamic State’s most brutal propaganda serves as a
vehicle by which to convey both vengeance and
supremacy.... [T]his content is not just aimed at
23 Schreck, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 20 October 2015, http://
www.rferl.org/content/ukraine-pow-march-war-crime/26548667.
html.
24 Barron, New York Times, 21 January 1991, http://www.nytimes.com/1
991/01/21/world/war-gulf-prisoners-iraqi-tv-broadcasts-interviews-wi
th-7-identified-allied.html.
25 ICRC, Customary IHL Database, Rule 113 (treatment of the dead).
26 Ibid.
27 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 relative to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Additional Protocol I), art. 51; and Additional Protocol II, art. 13.
28 ICRC, Customary IHL Database, Rule 1 (the principles of distinction
between civilians and combatants).
29 Ibid.

declared supporters. In fact, they are not even the primary target audience. Rather, this material is
intended for Islamic State’s active or potential opponents.30
As such, the videos constitute threats of violence
intended to spread terror among civilians. The videos
serve other objectives, including attracting new adherents and fighters, but this recruitment purpose thrives on
demonstrating how the Islamic State strikes fear into
those standing in its way. Thus, the primary purpose of
the threats of violence the videos represent can be interpreted as spreading terror among civilian populations
under, or potentially under, the control of the Islamic
State. Experts have recognized that use of digital and
cyber technologies to communicate threats of violence in
order to terrorize civilians can violate IHL.31

c) Measures or Acts of Terrorism Directed at
Protected Persons
Further, law of armed conflict outlaws measures or acts
of terrorism that are directed at persons protected by
IHL, including detainees and civilians.32 This principle
differs from the prohibition on acts of threats of violence
intended to spread terror among civilians because, first,
it applies to more than acts of threats of violence and,
second, it covers more than civilians.33 In communicating what potentially happens to captured enemy combatants, the videos record acts of violence intended to
terrorize persons already in custody or who might be
detained. Prisoners of the Islamic State freed during a
military raid by U.S. and Kurdish forces in Iraq reported
that their prison cell had a television “that was used to
play Islamic State videos of beheadings, and the captives
were forced to watch.”34 Similarly, the contents of the
videos and the manner in which the Islamic State’s
exploits them through online distribution makes the videos measures or instruments of terror directed at civilians protected by IHL.

2. The Atrocity Videos and War Crimes under
International Law
In certain circumstances, violations of IHL prohibitions
constitute war crimes for which individuals can be held
personally accountable. The statutes and jurisprudence
of international criminal tribunals from the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg to the ICC have
identified war crimes, delineated their legal elements,
and applied the crimes to specific incidents. Under this
law, a strong case can be made that the making and distribution of the atrocity videos is a war crime.

a) Outrages on Personal Dignity
As provided in the Rome Statute establishing the ICC,
“[c]ommitting outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment” is a war
30 Winter, pp. 22-23 (see fn 7).
31 Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare
(2013), p. 124.
32 See note 21.
33 ICRC, Customary IHL Database, Rule 2 (violence aimed at spreading
fear among the civilian population).
34 Gordon, New York Times, 27 October 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/
2015/10/28/world/middleeast/freed-prisoners-of-isis-tell-of-beatings-a
nd-torture.html?emc=edit_th_20151028&nl=todaysheadlines&nlid=
60638548&_r=0.

Brought to you by | Indiana University Bloomington
Authenticated
Download Date | 8/10/17 3:04 PM

Fidler

164

CRi 6/2015

Cyber War Crimes
crime as a “serious violation[] of the laws and customs
applicable in international armed conflict” and as a violation of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions
of 1949 applicable to non-international armed conflict.35 The statutes of other international criminal tribunals, such as the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda (ICTR),36 also recognized this war crime. The
ICC recognizes that the crime of committing outrages on
personal dignity can occur if the person is dead.37
Application of this crime has focused on physical acts to
dead bodies, such as mutilation, despoliation, and pillaging.38 However, the underlying objective informing
this crime is the protection of a person’s dignity, and such
dignity encompasses more than what happens to the
body after death. Making and distributing videos that
replay the gruesome, humiliating deaths of individuals
violates the dignity of these persons, much in the same
way that the coerced appearance of POWs in public or
on television breaches the principle of humane treatment
of persons who are hors de combat.

b) Acts or Threats of Violence Intended to
Spread Terror Among Civilians
In terms of acts or threats of violence the primary purpose of which is to spread terror among civilians, the
statute establishing the International Criminal Tribunal
for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) did not include such
acts or threats as an express crime. Instead, the ICTY
considered these acts or threats to be violations of the
laws and customs of war, and, thus, a war crime under its
statute.39 The statutes establishing the ICTR40 and the
Special Tribunal for Sierra Leone41 both expressly
included such acts or threats as a war crime. However,
the Rome Statute does not do so for the ICC.
For an atrocity video to be a war crime following the
ICTY’s jurisprudence, its making and distribution
would have to be viewed as an intentional threat of violence against civilians made with the primary purpose of
spreading terror among the civilian population.42 The
elements of the crime do not require that the civilian
population actually suffer terror. Nor must spreading
terror be the only purpose; other objectives can exist, as
long as spreading terror is the principal objective. ICTY
cases involving this war crime involved acts of violence,
such as indiscriminate shelling or sniper fire against
civilian areas, rather than threats of violence.43 The
ICTR did not have any cases applying its statute’s inclusion of this war crime. Under the Rome Statute, threats
of violence the primary purpose of which is spreading
terror among civilians would only arise in sentencing
individuals found guilty of crimes subject to the ICC’s
jurisdiction.44
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44

Rome Statute, art. 8 (b) & (c).
Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, art. 4.
ICC, Elements of Crimes (2002), pp. 27, 33.
ICRC, Customary IHL Database, Rule 113 (treatment of the dead).
Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, art. 3.
ICTR Statute, art. 4.
Agreement between the UN and the Government of Sierra Leone on the
Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone, art. 3.
ICTY, Prosecutor v. Stanislav Galić, 30 November 2006, Judgment on
Appeal.
See ibid.
Cryer et al., An Introduction to International Criminal Law and Procedure (2014).

c) Acts or Measures of Terrorism as War Crimes
Whether prohibited acts or measures of terrorism constitute war crimes is uncertain. The ICTY statute did not
include such acts or measures as war crimes, nor did the
ICTY face cases in which it had to determine whether
acts or measures of terrorism were war crimes as violations of the laws and customs of war. The ICTR included
such acts or measures as war crimes in its statute,45 but it
never applied this war crime in any case. The Rome Statute does not include acts or measures of terrorism as a
war crime subject to ICC jurisdiction. Given the weak
connection between the prohibition on acts or measures
of terrorism and international criminal law, arguing that
the atrocity videos are war crimes because they violate
the prohibition would not be persuasive.

3. Individual Responsibility for War Crimes and
the Atrocity Videos
Under IHL, individuals can be held personally responsible for committing war crimes. Under the Rome Statute,
individuals are criminally responsible if they contribute
to the commission of war crimes with the aim of furthering a group’s criminal activities or with the knowledge of
the group’s intention to commit such crimes.46 Under
these rules of criminal responsibility, those acting with a
common purpose in making and distributing the atrocity videos are criminally accountable even if they did not
participate in killing people. The “straight to video”
manner in which the Islamic State planned and perpetrated the recorded atrocities demonstrates that the people intentionally involved in producing and disseminating the videos to advance the Islamic State’s criminal
activities contributed directly to the commission of the
war crimes the videos constitute.

4. The Prohibition on Attacking Historic
Monuments and International Criminal Law
The Islamic State has also produced and disseminated
videos that record its destruction of historic monuments
in Iraq and Syria.47 IHL prohibits attacks against historical monuments,48 and the Rome Statute makes directing
such attacks a war crime in international and non-international armed conflict.49 The ICC has issued an indictment against an individual for committing this war
crime during armed conflict in Mali.50
While the Islamic State’s destruction of historical monuments certainly qualifies as war crimes in international
law, the making and distribution of videos recording the
destruction could only be a war crime if such videos
could be considered threats of violence the primary purpose of which is to spread terror in civilian populations.
As disturbing as the Islamic State’s violence against historical monuments is, videos recording this violence
would be hard to interpret as threats of violence against
civilians primarily intended to terrorize them.
45 ICTR Statute, art. 4.
46 Rome Statute, art. 25.
47 See McLaughlin, ABC News.com, 8 October 2015, http://abcnews.go.
com/International/video-shows-2000-year-arch-isis-destroyed-palmyr
a/story?id=34338007.
48 ICRC, Customary IHL Database, Rule 38 (attacks against cultural
property).
49 Rome Statute, art. 8 (b) & (e).
50 Whiting, Just Security, 29 September 2015, https://www.justsecurity.
org/26453/mali-icc-attacks-cultural-heritage/.
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IV. Assessing the Argument that Atrocity
Videos Constitute War Crimes
The novelty of arguing that the Islamic State violated
IHL prohibitions and committed war crimes in making
and distributing online the atrocity videos naturally
invites skepticism and criticism at technical, philosophical, and political levels. Technically, lawyers might perceive the atrocity videos are outside key terms and concepts, such as personal dignity or threats of violence,
used in treaties and customary international law to prohibit and criminalize certain activities in armed conflicts.
States and tribunals have applied IHL and international
criminal law on protecting the dignity of dead persons
more narrowly than the atrocity video argument does.
Similarly, threats of violence the primary purpose of
which is to spread terror among civilians have, to date,
meant immediate threats of actual kinetic violence, rather
than the more remote threat an atrocity video contains.
These counter-arguments connect to the philosophical
concern that arguing the atrocity videos are, themselves,
war crimes risks running afoul of the principle of nullum
crimen sine lege, or no criminal punishment without
law. Since the Nuremberg war crimes trials, this principle has played an important role in the development of
international criminal law.51 The principle underscores
the need to transform novel arguments about criminal
behavior into clear, specific law that puts people on
notice of their potential criminal responsibility.
From the political perspective, arguing that the atrocity
videos constitute war crimes seems, first, to distract
attention from the horrific crimes the videos record.
Here, the importance of the videos is the evidence they
provide of the commission of war crimes rather than the
videos themselves representing criminal activity in
armed conflict. Second, adding more war crimes to the
long list of crimes already committed does not bring
investigation and prosecution of Islamic State members
closer to reality. Although calls have been made for the
Security Council to refer the Islamic State to the ICC, the
Security Council is not likely to do so. Any referral that
is limited only to the actions of the Islamic State in the
armed conflicts in Iraq and Syria would be criticized for
ignoring alleged war crimes committed by other participants in these conflicts. But, these other participants
include Russia and its client state, Syria, and the United
States and its client state, Iraq-and neither Russia nor the
United States would refer their involvement in these
armed conflicts to the ICC. How we think about the
atrocity videos will have no impact on this fundamentally political problem.
In response to these possible criticisms, the technical
argument perhaps focuses too much on how war crimes
have been applied to date rather than on the breadth of
terms and concepts used in the relevant international
law. The objective of protecting the dignity of individuals during armed conflicts plays out in many contexts
because of the importance of this goal. The manner in
which IHL and international criminal law deal with
human dignity welcomes identifying new ways belligerents can violate such dignity, including the dignity of persons killed in war. Similarly, the centrality of protecting
civilians during armed conflicts means that threats of
violence intended to terrorize civilians should not be
51 See, for example, Rome Statute, art. 22.

read restrictively. Thus, the principle of nullum crimen
sine lege is not at risk in asserting that the atrocity videos
constitute war crimes.
This assertion does not lessen the seriousness of other
war crimes committed by the Islamic State. Indeed, the
focus on the videos highlights that the Islamic State is
committing atrocities within the meaning of international law and is transforming those atrocities into other
criminal behavior through the videos. A hallmark of
IHL and international criminal law has been adaptation
to how armed conflict evolves over time. Key principles,
such as protecting individual dignity and civilian populations, have broad application because war is not static
and new threats emerge as the technologies, tools, and
techniques of warfare change. The Islamic State’s atrocity videos represent something new that IHL and international criminal law should confront.
Taking the atrocity videos seriously as war crimes will
not change the political calculations of the permanent
members of the Security Council about referring the
armed conflicts in Iraq and Syria to the ICC. The point of
identifying how the Islamic State’s exploitation of digital
and cyber technologies in making and disseminating the
atrocity videos produces war crimes is not to solve the
riddle of geopolitics. Rather, the objective is to show that
this unprecedented aspect of current armed conflicts
needs international legal attention as part of the longstanding commitment to protecting humanitarian objectives in war.

V. Conclusion
Although headlines and news stories about gruesome
Islamic State videos circulating online have declined, the
Islamic State continues to make and disseminate globally digital recordings of its executions of detained persons and civilians.52 The Islamic State apparently
believes that these videos remain potent propaganda for
recruiting supporters and fighters and threatening and
intimidating its adversaries. Western countries continue
to struggle with how to deal with how the Islamic State
harnesses digital and cyber technologies for propaganda
and other purposes, and at the heart of this struggle is
finding effective ways to counter this phenomenon without compromising liberal commitments to privacy and
freedom of expression.
Seeing the Islamic State’s atrocity videos as war violations of IHL and crimes does not involve this struggle.
Outlawing and criminalizing this behavior are consistent with the values at the heart of IHL and international
criminal law supported by liberal democracies around
the world. Moving in this direction does not jeopardize
any person’s freedom of speech or privacy and puts the
onus directly on the people responsible for recording
atrocities and using the videos for purposes considered
criminal in armed conflict. Indeed, the arguments made
in this article resonate with one of the most fundamental
tenets of the laws of war-the right of belligerents to
adopt means of injuring the enemy is not unlimited.53
52 Lesaca, Brookings Institution Tech Tank, 24 September 2015, http://
www.brookings.edu/blogs/techtank/posts/2015/09/24-isis-social-medi
a-engagement (analyzing Islamic State videos through September 2015).
53 See Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on
Land, Annex: Regulations Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on
Land, art. 22.
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